Note: This paper is still under construction.
policy-generated increases in the interest rate increase, rather than reduce, the inflation rate. The behavioral mechanisms underlying these results are fairly easy to understand. Increases in nominal debt in the hands of the public that are not accompanied by any increase in expected future tax liabilities or by any increase in the price level leave the public with apparently increased wealth, which they will try to spend, until price increases erode their wealth or expectations about future taxes or economic growth make them scale back spending. In these circumstances, an increased nominal interest rate flows directly through to increased nominal government spending. In a flexible price model, the monetary authority loses any ability to affect the price level, as interest rate increases increase the rate of expansion of nominal government debt without any restrictive effect on spending plans.
There are some high-inflation countries and time periods in which simple flexprice models like these capture much of what goes on in monetary-fiscal interactions.
Interest rates are high, interest expense is a major part of the government budget, and monetary policy-makers are acutely aware that increases in interest rates are likely to increase the rate of issue of nominal debt. However in the US in the 1970's these effects were smaller and more indirect. The eventual paper will lay out the simple flex-price models that already exist in the literature and (I expect, or at least hope) will include a model with stickiness in which the monetary authority retains the ability to generate recession or accelerate recovery even though it loses control of trend inflation. People acquiring the debt that was being issued in this period had to be expecting that primary surpluses would eventually again become the norm, but it seems farfetched to suppose that they would have thought there was some simple rule, based on historical behavior patterns, that would allow prediction of when and how primary surpluses would re-emerge.
II. FISCAL POLICY IN
1 The primary surplus is revenues minus expenditures other than interest payments. It represents the net payments to holders of bonds, both through interest and retirement of outstanding debt. 2 Strictly speaking, a weighted average of future primary surpluses divided by the current debt must match the discount rate, so that if primary surpluses are growing, the ratio of current primary surplus to current debt could be below the discount rate. But if primary surpluses and real investment returns grow at the same rate, it will remain true that the primary surplus over debt must on average match the ratio of current earnings to investment values. is to illustrate how in principle such existence and uniqueness issues should be resolved, to show that explosive equilibria can exist, and to provide an example in which an interest-rate-rule policy that satisfies the Taylor Principal (more than onefor-one eventual response of the policy rate to inflation) can be consistent with a unique equilibrium in which inflation explodes -even though there is a monetary policy (fixed money stock) that could rule out such equilibria.
(1)
Monetary and fiscal policy are characterized by
The Taylor rule equation, if logged, would look a lot like standard policy rules in the literature. except that it constrains the coefficients on inflation and output growth to be identical. This constraint is to allow easy solution of the model.
The first order conditions of the consumer, together with the other equations, pro-
Note that Z t is monotone decreasing in v t . (8) But can we rule out the locally unstable paths as equilibrium solutions? The paths in which Z increases, and hence v decreases, can be ruled out. Once Z goes above its steady state, equilibrium requires that it be unbounded above, but this cannot happen even with v → 0, as can be seen from (9) The paths in which Z decreases, and hence v increases, cannot be ruled out. On these paths, v approaches a finite upper limit as Z → 0, while R and P t /P t−1 approach infinity. No feasibility constraint is violated if such a path persists forever, with ever accelerating inflation. This reflects the fact that agents in this model will hold positive real balances even if they know that they will lose all their value next period. Leeper's analysis of local uniqueness of stable paths suggests that no equilibrium may exist when active monetary policy (interest rate highly responsive to inflation) is combined with active fiscal policy (surplus unresponsive to the level of the debt). But in this model, a unique equilibrium exists even when we combine an exogenously fixed primary surplus with a Taylor-principle Taylor rule. The result is (except for a knife-edge special case) a unique, explosive, equilibrium. A shock to the policy rule that lowers the coefficient on inflation reduces inflation and its rate of growth.
There is a way for the monetary authority to end the explosiveness: Lower the interest rate and keep it fixed. Here the fiscal authority cannot necessarily end the explosiveness by switching to a passive fiscal policy, because that leaves the equilibrium non-unique.
If the monetary authority follows a fixed-M or fixed-M-growth rule, there is no equilibrium with active fiscal policy and passive fiscal policy delivers a unique equilibrium. The reason is that in this case, as inflation explodes, eventually real balances reach a level such that, with fixed M and prices expected to grow greatly, next period's real balances would have to shrink below the minimum level that agents are willing to hold. Since this implies money will be more in demand, and hence more valuable, than the explosive path implies, it will raise the value of money this period, and hence unravel the equilibrium as we work backward in time.
III.2. A very simple FTPL model. To fix ideas before we take up sticky price models,
we begin with a bare-bones flexible-price, cashless-economy FTPL model with only instantaneous short government debt:
Fisher :
Govt. Budg. Cnstr. :
Fiscal policy :τ = ε τ .
The starred equation is forward-looking. τ is the primary surplus, and the fiscal policy equation is saying that the primary surplus evolves exogenously, not responding to the real value of the debt. It is important to note that the coefficient of b on the right-hand side of the GBC (equation (12)) is r −ṗ, the ex post real rate of return on government debt, not ρ = r −p, wherep is the right-derivative at t of the expected future path of prices. We assume in this first model that the real interest rate ρ is an exogenously given constant. Because τ in this model does not grow exponentially, the government budget constraint can be solved forward to yield b t = B t /P t = τ t /ρ.
Because there is only one asset, nominal debt, the amount of nominal debt outstanding at t, B t , is fixed by history, so the B/P = τ condition uniquely determines the price level at any date. Substituting (11) into (10) to eliminate r produces the following equation in p:p
If θ > γ, this equation is unstable, so expected future inflation rates explode exponentially upward or downward, unlessṗ ≡ 0. If instead θ < γ, the equation is stable and the model has a unique, stable solution. When the equation is unstable, the model may still have a unique equilibrium solution. The question is whether we can rule out explosive time paths for inflation. Note that we have already used the assumption that real debt, the only asset, has a path that does not explode exponentially, and this uses up the implications of transversality. Explosive inflation paths would coincide with non-explosive real wealth and (implicitly) constant income and consumption. Of course these paths would be accompanied by, indeed in some sense can be seen as produced by, a fiscal policy that runs exploding conventional deficits as the inflation proceeds. This is required to maintain a constant primary surplus as interest expense explodes.
The combination of θ > γ monetary policy with the fiscal policy of (13) (Active Money/Active Fiscal in the terminology of Leeper (1991) ) as a permanent configuration may be implausible, even if it does constitute an equilibrium system. It seems likely that people would at least contemplate the possibility that the fiscal authorities would cease expanding the conventional deficit along such a path, or that the central bank would at some very high interest rate recognize the futility of future rises (and that the rises were themselves producing the inflation, by expanding the conventional deficit). It would be interesting to consider cases where the public has evolving beliefs about when and how the active/active configuration will be abandoned. But we focus attention here on the case where inflation is stable, or very slowly exploding, i.e. θ < γ, or θ/γ slightly above one.
In this case a permanent upward shift in τ (a δ-function shock to ε τ ) makes the price level jump downward and has no other effect. A δ-function shock to ε m makes bothp and r jump upward by equal amounts, after which both decay back toward 0 and ρ exponentially, as e −(γ−θ)t . In other words, monetary contraction has no effect on inflation, except to increase it.
III.3. A New Keynesian style model of boomerang monetary policy. While this
stark model is instructive, it is unrealistic in assuming perfectly flexible prices, and also importantly in assuming that all government debt is instantaneously short debt.
With inertial prices, actions that might in a flexible-price model produce downward jumps in the price level might be expected instead to produce recessions and smoother declines in the price level or the inflation rate. With long debt, the requirement that the real value of government debt match the present value of future primary surpluses can be met by jumps in the interest rate, which changes the value of outstanding long debt even if the price level does not change.
To get realistic dynamics, we need to make consumers prefer smooth consumption paths, which we do by adding a penalty on the squared derivative of consumption to the utility function. Finally we need to recognize that actual primarily surpluses respond automatically to the business cycle. To reflect that, we add a term making the primary surplus depend positively on the level of output. (It actually appears as making the growth of the primary surplus depend on the growth of output.)
Below is a model that adds these elements.
IS :
term struct. :
Phillips curve :
Fiscal policy :τ = ωċ + ε τ
habit :
Starred equations again are forward-looking, which means, since for the time being all shocks are white noise, that ε r and ε pc have no effect. a is the consol rate, i.e.
one over the price of a consol yielding a one-dollar per period permanent flow. b is the real value of the government debt, i.e. B/(aP), where a is the consol rate, P is the price level, and B is the number of outstanding consols. λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer's budget constraint, which depends on both consumption and its rate of change. The parameterτ does not appear in the equation system. It is the value of τ around which the model was linearized, which can be chosen arbitrarily because τ is nonstationary. The variable labeled "w" in the graphs is, in an unfortunate choice of notation,p, the inflation rate.
The point here is that in this model, though we are still in an "active fiscal, passive money" equilibrium, monetary contraction still has powerful effects, in the expected directions, on both real activity and inflation. The fact that monetary policy does not control the long run rate of inflation shows up in the behavior of the response of inflation w. After initially dropping, The inflation rate rises back above its steady state level by as much as it initially fell, and the rise is more sustained than the initial drop. This is the "stepping on a rake" phenomenon: Apparently effective measures to reduce inflation come back, after a delay, to produce precisely the opposite of the desired effect.
The expansionary fiscal shock the monetary and fiscal authorities and the public's expectations about future policy behavior are the same, and that both are unchanging. Part of the point of the graphs in the early sections of the paper is that it is unrealistic to suppose that people in general, and bond market participants in particular, had a stable, accurate view of fiscal policy, because the policy behavior was apparently undergoing drastic shifts.
It is possible, though, to investigate what happens to a non-structural descriptive model of the joint behavior of aggregate time series when primary surplus divided by market value of debt is added to the usual list of variables.
Shown in Figure 5 are responses of GDP, CPI, and the federal funds rate to a shock in the primary deficit divided by market value of debt. The responses are non-trivial and of the expected direction. In Figure IV we see that the responses to the part of federal funds rate shocks not correlated with the primary deficit shocks also have plausible shapes. If the primary deficit variable is omitted from the VAR, the "price puzzle" -a positive initial response of prices to an interest rate shock -is present, and including the primary deficit variable has gotten rid of it. These results are highly preliminary, however. There are no error bands on them, and they present an obvious identification problem -the primary deficit tends to rise at the same time that interest rates fall. Furthermore, it is difficult to rationalize this simultaneity as common response to the business cycle, since output does not move contemporaneously with the shock -it responds with a delay. It could be that the shock represents a common perception, either mistaken or based on information outside this collection of variables, that an expansionary policy move is necessary. Or it could represent a tendency of monetary policy to accommodate fiscal shifts. A model with more structure (i.e., more debatable assumptions) would be required to distinguish monetary and fiscal policy effects. FIGURE 5.
